Responsibility, Determinism and Freedom by Sie, M.M.S.K. (Maureen)
One 
 
RESPONSIBILITY, 
DETERMINISM, AND FREEDOM 
 
His dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded moment—and 
this, it must be admitted, would require a night darker than any night has 
ever been yet—he will jump out of the fighting line and be promoted, 
on account of his experience in fighting, to the position of the umpire 
over his antagonists in their fight with each other. 
 
“He” by Franz Kafka, cited by Hannah Arendt (Arendt, 1978, p. 202) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the three central concepts in the debate about responsi-
bility—determinism, responsibility, and freedom—and explains what interpre-
tation of them is relevant to this book. First, I argue that determinism is rele-
vant in so far as it forces us to explicate and sharpen our ideas about the other 
two concepts, freedom and responsibility. I also argue that what should worry 
us is not that if determinism is true we are never able to act without interfer-
ence or constraints. The real concern is the lack of originating powers of indi-
vidual agents that the truth of determinism implies. 
Second, I argue that questions about origination and ultimacy are con-
nected with our status as accountable subjects. We need not fear that if deter-
minism is true we can no longer be said to be agents (although we might worry 
about it). We can make a distinction between events and actions without using 
the concept of robust freedom and we can talk about human agency without 
using the concept of robust freedom. However, we sometimes feel responsible 
for our actions in a deep sense. We feel that besides being the cause of what we 
bring about, we are also truly to blame or praise for what we bring about. It is 
this deeper sense of responsibility that matters in our concerns about determin-
ism. If determinism is true and we do not originate our actions (or that which 
causes our actions), we are merely the fortunate or unfortunate causes of the 
actions for which we are praised or blamed. So much moral luck should disturb 
us. Praise and blame are not the kind of sentiments that can or should be sepa-
rated from considerations about individual desert. 
Third, with regard to freedom, I argue that we have, as yet, no adequate 
analysis that dissolves the apparent incompatibility between freedom and 
determinism. We cannot explain away the necessity of freedom in so far as 
deep responsibility is concerned. All excellent attempts to show that determin-
ism and freedom are compatible notwithstanding, determinism still appears to 
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threaten the kind of freedom necessary for deep responsibility. Therefore, we 
still need a story to tell about our daily practices of responsibility in so far as 
we believe that the praise or blame we bestow on individual agents is justified. 
At the end of this chapter, I hope to have illuminated why we need to take 
a closer look at the view that I call “practical compatibilism.” Both prominent 
defenders of this view, Susan Wolf and R. Jay Wallace, acknowledge that pre-
vious philosophers have not solved the apparent incompatibility between 
determinism and deep responsibility. As a reaction they propose a new 
approach that appears promising in the light of our diagnosis of the problem, 
although, as I argue in subsequent chapters, it has its own problems. 
Those who already feel at home in philosophical discussions about 
responsibility could start reading the third section of this chapter. 
 
 
2. Determinism 
 
Because many people involved in the discussion about our practices of respon-
sibility claim not to understand precisely what the thesis of determinism is 
(Strawson, 1962, p. 59), we need some initial definition to start out with. Ted 
Honderich, who defends the intelligibility and the truth of determinism, defines 
it as the theory that⎯like everything else that happens⎯all our mental events 
and actions are the effects of things that happened in the past. They have to 
happen or are necessitated, and cannot be owed to origination. This absence of 
origination, as will become clear, is important. According to Honderich, it 
means that all our actions have a cause, which he understands as an event or 
condition within the causal circumstances. He understands the causal circum-
stances in turn as a set of conditions or events that necessitate or stand in nomic 
connection with something later, an effect. The causal circumstances make it 
impossible that any event other than the effect will occur (Honderich, 1993, pp. 
11–18). The crucial point here is that determinism implies that whatever hap-
pens is determined by prior events, which are again determined by prior events, 
and so on. 
According to Robert Kane any event is determined if conditions arise the 
joint occurrence of which is sufficient for the occurrence of the event (Kane, 
1996, p. 8). If the joint occurrence of some conditions is sufficient for the 
occurrence of an event a, then given that these conditions obtain, a is inevita-
ble. If determinism is true, all events, including our choices, decisions, and 
actions, are necessitated and no room exists for origination by a single individ-
ual. This means no clear and distinct activity of a single being exists of causing 
or initiating a mental event, a choice or decision, or an action. 
Which conditions are to be regarded as the determining conditions 
depends upon the version of determinism in hand. For theological determinism, 
God’s omnipotence and what follows from His decrees are the determining 
conditions. For physical determinism, the determining conditions are the laws 
of nature together with the antecedent events. For psychological determinism, 
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the determining conditions are our motives and desires that in turn are under-
stood to be the inevitable products of our birth and upbringing. What all 
versions equally lack is an “area of genuine agency,” as Thomas Nagel has put 
it (Nagel, 1979, p. 183). The view that everything is determined by a combina-
tion of laws linking events and prior events has no room for any activity that 
constitutes the agency of the individual involved in the chain of events. 
Nowadays, the most cited version of determinism is physical determinism 
as defined by Peter van Inwagen. His definition is the conjunction of two 
theses: 
 
(a) for every instant of time, a proposition exists that expresses the state 
of the entire physical world at that moment, and 
(b) if x and y are propositions that express the state of the world at some 
instants, then x together with the laws of physics entails y. 
 
In this definition it is taken for granted that the concept of a state does not logi-
cally entail its effects or causes, and that a change in things in the world neces-
sarily implies a change in the state of the world. An advantage of this definition 
is that we need not define or know exactly what a law of physics is, as long as 
we agree that it cannot be rendered false by human beings. It then follows that 
if determinism is true, our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and 
what happened in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we 
were born, nor is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the conse-
quences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us (Van 
Inwagen, 1983, p. 16). This argument is called the “consequence argument.”  
Not everyone is convinced of the validity of this argument, but possible 
objections to it play no significant role in the contemporary discussion about 
our practices of responsibility. Hence, with the exception of the objection of 
David Lewis that I sketch below (sec. 4.A.i), I will not discuss the argument. 
Determinism, no matter if and how we understand it exactly, sees the world in 
terms of causes and effects, causes and effects that are inevitable. That, as I 
show in the sections below, appears to be incompatible with our status as 
responsible human beings. 
So why not reject determinism? As some have argued, physical deter-
minism is in retreat anyway, for example in the physical sciences, where 
quantum theory has reintroduced indeterminism (Kane, 1996, p. 9). Unfortu-
nately, that in itself is no solution, especially not if it is our status as responsi-
ble human beings that we are concerned with. The indeterminism of quantum 
physics concerns elementary particles that—just as the random swerves of the 
atoms that were once postulated by the Epicureans to account for the existence 
of free will—are a long way from providing the sort of freedom that we need 
for upholding human responsibility. 
First, random swerves of elementary particles lose almost any signifi-
cance in larger physical systems such as the human brain and body; indeter-
minism at a micro level does not surface in the behavior of our brains or 
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bodies. This means that an adapted version of determinism is still defensible. 
This version, called “near-determinism,” holds that while indeterminism exists 
at the micro level—the level of small particles—determinism still exists at the 
macro level, which includes neural events and everything with which we are 
ordinarily familiar (Honderich, 1993, p. 140). Second, even if the indetermina-
cies were occasionally to have large-scale effects on human behavior, this still 
would be of no help to the responsibility debate, for the effects caused by the 
indeterminacies would be unpredictable and uncontrollable, and unable to 
expand our responsibility. So this type of indeterminism provides no ready 
solution to the problem of responsibility. If we want to defend our practices of 
responsibility by arguing in favor of indeterminism we need better arguments 
(see Kane, 1996, Pt. 2; O’Connor, 1995; Searle, 2001, ch. 9). 
Whereas most philosophers agree that indeterminism does not enhance 
our freedom and control, far less people believe that our freedom and control 
are threatened by determinism in the first place. These people are commonly 
called “compatibilists, their opponents “incompatibilists.” Since the thesis of 
this book is based upon the initial plausibility of such a threat—the initial plau-
sibility of incompatibilism—let us take a closer look at those so-called 
compatibilist positions. 
 
 
A. Control, Constraints, and Impediments 
 
According to Daniel C. Dennett, our fear of a loss of control if physical deter-
minism is true is unwarranted and completely misplaced. He argues that only 
the control that other agents exercise over us can diminish our freedom and 
lessen our responsibility. If someone makes us perform action a, we are not 
responsible for a (not as responsible as we would have been had we done a 
without anyone’s interference). Nature, though, Dennett argues, does not 
control us in that way. Nature does not make us do things as though we were 
puppets on a string. The reason we fear determinism, according to Dennett, is 
that our thinking about causation is infected with the feelings that accompany 
our idea of being controlled and interfered with by the malicious brain-
manipulators and other ingenious scientists who populate the literature on 
responsibility. Once we understand that this is the wrong way to conceive of 
the manner in which nature determines us, we will see that our fear of deter-
minism is mistaken (Dennett, 1984, pp. 61–66). 
Dennett traces the origins of the topic of control and its relation to causa-
tion and determinism back to the early seventies (Dennett, 1984, p. 51). But 
this does not mean that the topic discussed under the heading of “control” is 
that new. The reason control has only recently come under discussion as such 
is probably that full-blown agent theories of freedom have only recently 
become influential in the discussion on responsibility. Like the notion of 
control, agent theories of freedom came to the fore in the early seventies with 
Harry G. Frankfurt’s (Frankfurt, 1971) and Gerald Dworkin’s (Dworkin, 1988) 
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elaborations on the hierarchical concept of a person. Unlike action theories of 
freedom, these theories treated freedom, free will, and autonomy primarily as 
characteristics of agents, which shifted the attention from the possibility of 
freely willed or autonomous actions in a deterministic universe to the possibil-
ity of autonomous agency or agents with free will in a deterministic universe. It 
is no wonder that Dennett’s criticism—that incompatibilism suffers from a so-
called animistic conception of causation—appeared in the debate on responsi-
bility long before the notion of control came into fashion. Those who endorsed 
this kind of criticism are called “constraint compatibilists” (see, for example, 
Ayer, 1954, p. 22). Although constraint compatibilists focus on the freedom of 
individual actions rather than on the agent’s control, the underlying idea was 
much the same: nature does not constrain us, and only constraint makes us 
unfree. 
As I explain in section 4.B below, Dennett’s compatibilism and the older 
version of it (constraint compatibilism) concentrate on a concept of responsi-
bility that is called “superficial.” The incompatibility between determinism and 
responsibility that I will concentrate on in this book does not confuse the 
difference between causes that impede the will and causes that do not. What 
troubles the type of incompatibilist that I discuss is that the mere absence of 
constraints and obvious impediments to our will does not guarantee that our 
actions are up to us; it does not guarantee that we are ultimately answerable for 
our actions. This concern is typical of what I call “ultimacy pessimism,” 
because this position is pessimistic about the prospects of finding an adequate 
justification for our practices of responsibility (see Double, 1991, p. 365). 
 
 
B. Ultimacy 
 
Ultimacy pessimism holds that we are not responsible for those actions that can 
be traced back to an origin outside ourselves. It believes that if an action—let 
me stipulate that it is an unconstrained action—can be traced back completely 
to a combination of our upbringing, the culture in which we were brought up, 
and our biological constitution, we are not responsible for it because we are not 
responsible for things that lie outside our control. Ultimacy pessimism gives 
voice to the fear that if all our mental events (including our choices and deci-
sions) and actions are effects of things that happened in the past, together with 
some determining conditions—as determinism states—the origin of our 
choices, decisions, and actions always lies outside ourselves. 
On closer examination, as Nagel has put it, we are disturbingly subject to 
luck. We do not determine what kind of person we are and/or which inclina-
tions, capacities, and temperament we have; nor do we determine the kind of 
problems and situations we face. We also do not determine how we are formed 
by antecedent circumstances or how our actions turn out (Nagel, 1979, p. 177). 
This is what is called “moral luck,” and it is the existence of moral luck that 
makes the ultimacy pessimist so pessimistic. If even our unconstrained actions 
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are only effects, then what would make us responsible for them? As Roderick 
M. Chisholm writes: “If the flood of desire caused the weak-willed man to give 
in, just as the flood caused the poorly constructed dam to break, then just as the 
dam, the man is not responsible for the consequences” (Chisholm, 1964, p. 25). 
Again, the simple rejection of determinism in favor of indeterminism 
cannot come to our rescue. Random swerves that somehow take place in our 
brains or bodies do not provide the kind of ultimacy we are looking for. What 
we want is to be the origin or the originator of the actions we are held respon-
sible for. We want to matter as agents in the chain of events, not because 
something happens randomly inside our bodies, something that triggers other 
events to take place, but because we actively do something, something for 
which we are responsible. 
Choosing between indeterminism and determinism does not solve the 
problem of responsibility and free will. Indeterminists have as much explaining 
to do as hard determinists have. The basic anxiety appears to be the difficulty 
in understanding our exact place as agents in a world of events (compare 
Chisholm, 1964, p. 24). Determinism primarily forces us to illuminate and 
sharpen our ideas about freedom, responsibility, and the relation between them. 
If everything is determined by prior events, then why do we treat human 
agency any differently than the agency of other beings with causal powers? 
And, if we do not believe that human agency is a special kind of agency, how 
do we defend our daily practices of responsibility in which we engage in a 
vocabulary of blame, praise, faults, desert, and merit, a vocabulary that we 
understand to be appropriate for humans but not for very young children, 
animals, and inanimate objects with causal powers? Those are the issues that 
are the subject of this book. So, what about this special kind of agency that 
figures in our daily practices of responsibility? How exactly are we to perceive 
of it? 
 
 
3. Responsibility 
 
One of the difficulties in discussing the relation between freedom and respon-
sibility is that both concepts as we use them in our daily practices are ill-
defined. Let us start with the concept of responsibility. We say, for instance, 
that the bank clerk who hands over the money to a robber in a cool and deliber-
ate manner is not responsible for the bank’s loss of money: We feel that if 
someone has a gun held to the head, that person has no real options other than 
to comply with the demand made, and is not to blame for that action. However, 
if someone were to ask who was responsible for handing over the money to the 
robber, we would all point to the bank clerk, since the clerk was the person 
who handed over the money. 
Also we could say that the bank clerk acted responsibly and made the 
right decision in handing over the money to the robber instead of trying to 
resist. If we say that the bank clerk acted responsibly, we mean that the clerk 
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acted appropriately, even in a praiseworthy manner, given the dangerous cir-
cumstances. Praiseworthiness and its opposite, blameworthiness, are in turn 
related to the concept of moral responsibility. Nevertheless, we would not say 
that the bank clerk was morally responsible for handing over the money to the 
robber, for in this case “morally responsible” means “blameworthy” and we do 
not think that the employee is blameworthy. 
If, finally, we discover that the bank clerk is a programmed robot, we 
would still point to the robot as the one responsible for handing over the 
money, but we would skip all talk about moral responsibility, blame, and 
praiseworthiness. True and full moral responsibility is reserved for the re-
stricted class of adult human beings. 
We use “responsible” to refer to such apparently diverse things as “being 
the cause of x” (identifying the bank clerk as the person who handed over the 
money) and “being an appropriate subject of (moral) evaluation” (which the 
robot is not, but the human employee is). In the philosophical discussion on 
responsibility, the distinction between responsible in the “agent is the cause” 
sense and responsible in the “moral evaluation” sense is referred to as that 
between “superficial responsibility” and “deep responsibility” (see, for 
example, Wolf, 1990, pp. 40–41). 
The example of the bank clerk also indicates another distinction, between 
“responsible” as a generic term referring to accountability, and “responsible” 
as a predicate that we use to evaluate the action as worthy of blame or praise. 
In the latter sense, “responsibly” and “morally responsible” can be used to refer 
to agents that should be praised for an act (they acted responsibly) or that 
should be morally blamed for an act (they are morally responsible). The first, 
generic sense of the term depends upon accountability conditions for its correct 
application, whereas the latter, evaluative sense depends upon blameworthiness 
conditions for its correct application (Wallace, 1994, p. 70). 
In terms of the above distinctions, the topic responsibility as discussed in 
this book is that of deep accountability, the status of people as appropriate 
subjects of the reactive attitudes and emotions such as resentment, blame, 
indignation, and praise. I refer to these as “the reactive or moral sentiments”—
the sentiments that were made influential through Peter F. Strawson’s 
discussion of responsibility (Strawson, 1962). This said, I return to the use of 
the terms “responsibility,” “deep responsibility,” and, sometimes, “moral re-
sponsibility” in a loose sense, as is common in the current debate. Whenever 
the distinction matters, I make clear which of the concepts is at stake. 
 
 
A. Expectations and the Moral Sentiments 
 
Wallace has developed a convincing reactive account of the relation between 
responsibility and the reactive attitudes and emotions. He introduces the notion 
of an “expectation” as the important mediating term (Wallace, 1994, chs. 2 and 
3). 
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According to Wallace’s account, holding someone responsible must be 
understood as holding someone to an expectation, which in turn should be un-
derstood as the susceptibility to a range of reactive attitudes and emotions with 
regard to that individual (although this susceptibility should not be understood 
as something that is conceptually prior to the holding responsible). People are 
susceptible to a range of reactive attitudes and emotions with regard to an indi-
vidual if a wrong committed by this individual provokes: 
 
(1) a reaction with one of the moral sentiments, or 
(2) the judgment that a reaction with one of the moral sentiments would 
be appropriate, or 
(3) both (1) and (2) (Wallace, 1994, p. 21). 
 
The inclusive disjunction is necessary because it is possible to hold someone 
responsible without experiencing any of the reactive attitudes or emotions. 
Some people, for instance, are not very prone to moral sentiments. Others 
do not experience some of the reactive attitudes or sentiments—such as the 
negative ones of blame and moral indignation—with regard to a special group 
of people, for instance those they love or those they fear. Still others will only 
experience the moral sentiments with regard to the people they care about or 
love most. These possibilities do not necessarily imply that we do not hold the 
individuals concerned responsible for their behavior. It is not the actual reac-
tive attitude or emotion alone that establishes that we hold someone responsi-
ble. However, when someone commits a wrong and we neither experience any 
reactive attitudes or emotions nor believe them to be appropriate, then there 
appears little reason to say that we hold this person responsible (Wallace, 1994, 
p. 23). 
The general background condition of the inclusive disjunction is that the 
reactive attitudes and emotions are available as a reaction to the transgression 
of some expectations. We might imagine a society in which the reactive atti-
tudes and emotions are not available. In that case the inclusive disjunction is of 
no use because nobody will in fact react with the moral sentiments and/or 
judge that it would be appropriate to do so. If we understand the availability of 
“a” reaction to the transgression of some expectations as crucial, instead of 
“the reactions that are available in our culture and which happen to be the 
moral sentiments,” Wallace’s reactive account is also compatible with, for 
instance, so-called shame cultures—which, it is claimed, do not know the sen-
timents of blame, praise, and indignation, but only that of shame (Wallace, 
1994, pp. 36–37). 
This compatibility with other cultures—especially ones in which the 
moral sentiments are not available—speaks strongly in favor of the reactive 
account. It enables us to embrace it even if we entertain an in itself healthy 
suspicion to the moral sentiments. 
Another advantage of Wallace’s reactive account is that it explains why 
we use the concept of responsibility in such diverse ways. This diversity is 
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partly due to the different domains of expectations: the legal domain, the moral 
domain, and the personal domain. Each of these is regulated by its own norms 
and values and, correspondingly, by its own normative expectations and 
demands. That we nevertheless use the term “responsible” in all domains can 
be explained by our shared susceptibility to some range of reactions—in our 
Western culture those of the reactive attitudes and emotions—to which the 
violation of a demand or expectation gives rise. 
The range of attitudes and emotions that Wallace accepts as relevant to 
the stance of holding someone to an expectation is much narrower than that of 
Strawson. Strawson makes a distinction between three different kinds of reac-
tive attitudes: those involving direct interpersonal relations (personal reactive 
attitudes like resentment and gratitude), the vicarious analogs of them that 
primarily concern someone’s behavior toward others (moral reactive attitudes 
like moral indignation), and the self-reactive attitudes like guilt and remorse 
(Strawson, 1962, pp. 62–64). Wallace excludes those reactive attitudes that 
relate more broadly to the interpersonal relationships, such as love, gratitude, 
hurt feelings, and shame, and restricts himself to those sentiments he calls the 
“moral sentiments,” the main ones being: moral blame, resentment, moral 
indignation, and moral praise (Wallace, 1994, pp. 25–29). 
I accept this restriction, but without the addition of and the emphasis on 
moral. In my view, the main distinction (although it is not a robust one) is that 
between superficial and deep responsibility, not that between responsibility and 
moral responsibility. I explain this preference later on. First I explain the 
distinction between superficial and deep responsibility as it is normally used. 
 
 
B. Superficial Responsibility 
 
Superficial responsibility is the kind of responsibility that we share with all 
things that can be said to cause other things to happen (inanimate things, 
animals, artifacts, and human beings). When used to refer to something as a 
cause, “p is responsible for a” identifies the person or thing (p) to which 
something—a state of affairs, an event, or an action (a)—can be traced back. 
For example: The rain is responsible for the muddy streets. Correspondingly, 
we could believe that “p is responsible for a” means “p is the agent of a,” and 
that “p is the agent of a” means “p made the intentional bodily movements 
constituting a.” This would keep things very simple and straightforward be-
cause we often make bodily movements that cause things to happen. What 
could possibly be problematic about our daily practices of responsibility? The 
rain is responsible for the muddy streets and p is responsible for tracking the 
mud into the house. Unfortunately, this apparently unproblematic approach to 
our daily practices of responsibility fails to identify all that we want it to iden-
tify. Let me explain. 
Our actions, in so far as they are intentional bodily movements, are not 
the only things for which we might be held responsible. We are also often held 
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responsible for omissions, things we did not do and which did not involve any 
bodily movements, for instance, forgetting our mother’s birthday. Likewise, we 
are often held responsible for accidents or mistakes, bodily movements that are 
not intended—not under the description under which we are held responsible 
for them; for instance, stupidly hurting someone in our attempt to get into the 
train. Finally, we are often held responsible for careless and reckless behavior, 
behavior that need not necessarily involve intentional bodily movements; for 
instance, stumbling over a small child while running across a schoolyard. All 
of these are examples of actions for which we can be held responsible, but 
which cannot be translated into intentional bodily movements. 
What appears to be crucial in our assessment of p as being responsible for 
a is not p’s (intentional) bodily movements that constitute a as such, but p’s 
bodily movements or lack thereof relative to a normative background. Rules, 
norms, and values determine what we should or should not do, and it is only 
relative to those that we are held responsible for actions and/or omissions. 
Even at the most superficial level, responsibility is connected with expectations 
concerning the appropriate behavior and actions in certain contexts. This is 
why not paying attention can be something for which we are held responsible, 
namely, if we believe that we should have paid attention in that particular 
situation. Likewise, making mistakes can be something for which we are held 
responsible, namely, if we believe that we should not make mistakes in that 
particular situation, and so on. 
As soon as we go beyond our assessment of p as being “a mere cause of 
a,” we enter the normative domain. That is why the distinction between super-
ficial and deep responsibility is not a very robust one. Both superficial and 
deep responsibility are connected with our ability to act according to norms, 
values, and expectations. The distinction nevertheless helps to focus our atten-
tion on a part of the discussion on responsibility: the part connected to auton-
omy. I come back to this in section 6 below and, more elaborately, in the 
following chapter. 
For the moment, let me note that I will not discuss the question whether 
we are superficially responsible, whether we ever do things that we should not 
do and do so freely (where “freely” stands for: without being forced or inter-
fered with by powers outside ourselves). It appears odd to seriously question 
this. It also appears odd to suppose that the distinction between superficial and 
deep responsibility could be the solution to a complicated philosophical discus-
sion that has been going on for ages. Not that the activity of people who phi-
losophize legitimizes itself, but the distinction is obvious. The incompatibilists 
and ultimacy pessimists central to this book reject the possibility of constraint 
compatibilism, discussed in the previous section. 
The incompatibilism and ultimacy pessimism that I focus on agree with 
the constraint compatibilist’s contention that a difference exists between being 
forced or constrained by external impediments, such as other human beings, 
and not being forced or constrained and, therefore, in some sense being free 
and responsible. What they do not believe is that this distinction alone suffices 
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to justify our daily practices of responsibility. What they are concerned with is 
whether our superficial responsibility for things ever reflects a deeper respon-
sibility. 
 
 
C. Deep and Moral Responsibility 
 
With regard to responsibility, a class of distinctions exists that are related to the 
idea of autonomy. I call these “the autonomy-related distinctions.” Our use of 
the autonomy-related distinctions surfaces in the fact that we sometimes say of 
human beings that they are responsible for their actions in a way that animals, 
robots, very young children, mentally ill, or mentally disabled people are not. 
When we use “responsible” in this deeper sense, we claim that p should not 
have done a and that nothing prevented p from not doing a, and that p is, 
somehow, a fit subject of credit and discredit, that p deserves to be blamed or 
praised for a (Wolf, 1990, p. 41). Were we to discover, as in the case of the 
bank clerk, that p is a robot, or a child, or a mentally ill person, we would 
exempt p and no longer hold p deeply responsible for a. 
The (in)compatibility of deep responsibility with determinism is often 
discussed under the heading of the (in)compatibility of moral responsibility 
with determinism. This is understandable, for moral responsibility—which is 
related to the moral expectations and demands that we hold people to—
occupies a central and important place in our daily lives. It regulates large parts 
of our interpersonal relationships and affects our thinking about important 
social and political areas, such as social reform, law, and punishment. Deep 
responsibility need not necessarily be of a moral nature, though. As Wolf 
points out, we also judge the works of art of a mature artist differently than the 
finger paintings of a young child (without claiming anything about their 
beauty; Wolf, 1990, pp. 7–8). When judging and evaluating the work of some-
one we consider to be a deeply responsible artist, we take into account that it 
reflects artistic choices and preferences in a way that the work of, for instance, 
a young child does not. Both can make an ugly painting, but only the first will 
be held deeply responsible for doing so because the painting reflects the wrong 
artistic choices. 
What appears crucial to the class of moral sentiments of blame, resent-
ment, indignation, and praise is that each sentiment can be understood as a 
reaction to a perceived failing or failure of the agent, or, in the case of positive 
emotions and attitudes, as a reaction to a perceived accomplishment or 
achievement of the agent. And failures and achievements need not necessarily 
be of a moral nature: For instance, we can also blame someone for giving a bad 
piano performance. 
Wallace rightly argues that condemning a piano performance for its emp-
tiness or lack of intelligence is different from morally blaming someone for a 
wrong that is committed (Wallace, 1994, p. 54). Unfortunately, the example 
fails to establish what Wallace wants it to establish, which is the substantial 
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difference between moral and deep responsibility. Condemning a piano per-
formance for its emptiness or lack of intelligence is not the correct analog of 
morally blaming someone. The analog of morally blaming someone for a 
wrong committed is blaming a pianist for a bad performance. If we blame 
someone for a bad performance, we add a force and quality that differs from 
condemning the performance, because we add that it was the pianist who failed 
to do what the pianist was able to do. 
Blaming differs from merely describing a performance as “bad.” If people 
blame you for your bad piano performance, this is directly related to the 
expectations that they think you are capable of fulfilling. This is why blame—
its special gravity and negativity notwithstanding—is sometimes preferred to 
the simple description of an action as “bad.” After all, if people do not blame 
you for the bad piano performance but merely comment on its poor quality, this 
might also reflect their low esteem of you or their lack of expectations 
regarding your abilities as a performer. Likewise, praise can be hurtful and 
insulting when it is a reaction to your exceeding someone’s expectations of 
you. Praising someone excessively for a mediocre performance is a very effec-
tive way of communicating our low esteem of the performer’s abilities to 
perform any better. 
Wallace’s account is ambiguous with respect to the distinction between 
moral and deep responsibility. On the one hand, he explicitly states that moral 
responsibility can be distinguished by the “(. . .) kind of expectations it is 
bound up with” (Wallace, 1994, pp. 35–36). On the other hand, he emphasizes 
the special character, quality, and force of the moral responses (Wallace, 1994, 
p. 54). As may be clear, I abandon this second emphasis in favor of his first 
contention. Although moral responsibility may have a special importance to us, 
it is not only in the moral variant of deep responsibility that our responses to 
the actions and behavior of others acquire a distinctive quality and force. They 
acquire this distinctive quality and force because what they are reactions to is 
the perceived failing or succeeding of someone against the background of some 
domain of demands and expectations. 
Let me recapitulate. P is blameworthy or praiseworthy for a if p is a 
responsible subject and if p failed to fulfill or succeeded in fulfilling some 
expectations by doing a. P is an appropriate subject of the moral sentiments of 
blame, praise, and resentment if p is a responsible subject. P is a responsible 
subject if p is able to fulfill several—yet to be described—expectations. 
The connection between these three is made by Wallace’s definition of 
holding responsible: the susceptibility to some range of reactive emotions and 
attitudes (if these are available in the society we are concerned with) when 
expectations are breached. The susceptibility to this range of attitudes and 
emotions means that we react with these attitudes and emotions and/or find 
such a reaction appropriate. In the following chapter, I explain why Wallace 
concentrates on holding someone morally responsible, which he defines as: 
“[Holding] a person to moral expectations that one accepts” (Wallace, 1994, p. 
51). 
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I am quite aware that these definitions, unrefined as they are, are contest-
able on several points. People can argue that the moral sentiments and 
emotions play a far more foundational role than is allowed by these definitions. 
See, for instance, Lars Hertzberg, who argues that a world without blame 
would require the abolition of everything involving rules and the teaching of 
rules. Such a world, he claims, would be devoid of all institutional behavior, 
including science and language. It would leave nothing that we would care to 
call a human society (Hertzberg, 1975, p. 501). From such a pragmatist 
perspective, the idea that the appropriateness of our moral sentiments should be 
related to p’s being a responsible subject, and p’s being a responsible subject to 
p’s ability to fulfill some (yet to be specified) expectations, is controversial. 
With regard to moral responsibility, pragmatists will argue that p’s being a 
responsible subject is exhausted by p’s being an appropriate subject of the 
moral sentiments, in whatever sense “appropriateness” is defined in our daily 
practices. 
On the other hand, we might also wish to argue that the moral sentiments 
only have meaning if we are agents who possess free will. Paul Benson, for 
example, argues that the importance of free will remains unaltered if we 
concentrate on the question whether it would be rational to give up our under-
standing of others as free and responsible beings (Benson, 1990; his argument 
is a reaction to Wolf, 1981). We might also argue that the so-called appropri-
ateness of our moral sentiments can only be defended on the basis of a full-
blown ethical theory, such as utilitarianism. And so on. 
Let me stress that the above definitions are not meant to conclude the 
debate about what the moral sentiments are or what exactly responsibility is. 
They are meant as a description of the battleground that is the subject of this 
book. The important questions are yet to be posed, for example the following: 
When exactly are we appropriate subjects of the moral sentiments? What does 
it mean to be able to fulfill expectations? Are we capable of fulfilling expecta-
tions? And so on. Let us proceed to the heart of the battleground: the condi-
tions of responsibility. 
 
 
4. Freedom 
 
We hold people responsible if we hold them to some expectations. We hold 
them to some expectations if we are susceptible to the moral sentiments with 
regard to them. Our susceptibility to the moral sentiments is justified if they are 
capable of fulfilling the expectations we have of them. In order to be capable of 
fulfilling these expectations, we need to: 
 
(1) have the abilities that are relevant to fulfill these expectations, and 
(2) be in the circumstances that allow us to fulfill these expectations. 
 
It is a widespread conviction that people who breached our expectations are not 
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responsible for this if they could not have done otherwise. This intuition is 
philosophically translated into the so-called principle of alternative possibilities 
(hereafter PAP): A person p is only responsible for an action a if that person 
could have done something other than a. 
How should we understand this counterfactual freedom? Take again my 
example of the bank clerk from the previous section. Let us for convenience 
suppose the clerk is a woman called Mary. Mary is held (superficially) respon-
sible for handing over the money, because she could also not have handed over 
the money. But she was not (deeply) responsible, because she could not have 
done otherwise. She had no reasonable alternative to handing over the money. 
It is not completely clear what we mean when we say that people “could or 
could not have done otherwise than they did.” 
 
 
A. The Conditional Analysis 
 
One influential proposal is that we should analyze “p could have done other-
wise” as “p would have done otherwise if p had willed, chosen or decided to do 
so.” This captures the first superficial sense in which our bank clerk could have 
done otherwise. Nothing prevented Mary from handing over the money. She 
handed over the money in a cool and deliberate way, so had she decided 
otherwise, she could have done something else than hand over the money. This 
analysis of our ability to do otherwise is known as “the conditional analysis” 
and is commonly ascribed to George Edward Moore (Moore, 1911). According 
to Wallace, though, it can be traced back in the empiricist tradition as far as 
Thomas Hobbes’s Of Liberty and Necessity (Wallace, 1994, p. 193). 
A great advantage of this analysis is that it is compatible with determin-
ism. Mary’s unexercised freedom to do otherwise is not in contradiction with 
her having been determined to do what she did, because had she chosen, 
willed, or decided to do otherwise, the causal circumstances in the past would 
have been different. It is still true that for every event conditions exist the joint 
occurrence of which is sufficient for the occurrence of that event. 
A common objection to this analysis is that it fails to do justice to issues 
concerning our freedom of will. After all, Mary could not have done anything 
other than hand over the money to the robber in the second deep sense of the 
above example (see Watson, 1987a, p. 160). She could not have decided, 
willed, or chosen not to hand over the money, because she had a gun pointed at 
her head. If she could not have decided, willed or chosen otherwise, then she 
could not have done anything other than hand over the money, whereas it is 
still true that she would have done otherwise if she had chosen, willed, or 
decided to do otherwise. The conditional analysis fails for it is possible that the 
analysans “p would have done anything other than a if p had chosen, willed, or 
decided to” is true, and the analysandum “p is able to do a” is not (see 
Chisholm, 1964 and Lehrer, 1968; for objections see Wolf, 1990, p. 99). 
We could doubt whether the second sense in which the bank clerk is 
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unable not to hand over the money—that is, the sense in which she has no rea-
sonable alternative—is a real inability. The fact that people are unable to 
choose, decide, or will something does not mean that they are unable to do the 
thing that they are unable to choose, will, or decide to do. If someone is offered 
fifty dollars to tell the time, the added incentive will render it relatively impos-
sible not to tell the time. But this inability is not a real inability not to tell the 
time. The offer does not render us incapable of not telling the time. (The 
example is Wolf’s, 1990, p. 98.) Not all senses of “not being able to” constitute 
a robust inability and not all, so it appears, equally undermine our freedom. 
This fact is partly obscured when we use examples in which extreme 
offers or threats figure, because offers you cannot refuse and threats are 
manipulative measures that are by definition understood as freedom-under-
mining: if they are not freedom-undermining, they are not manipulative. I 
come back to this elaborately in the next chapter (sec. 3.B). To prevent this 
prior assumption from obscuring matters, we should imagine someone choos-
ing or deciding to do something that renders them unable to do anything else. If 
people hold their breath, for instance, it becomes relatively impossible for them 
to do anything else. This is not a real inability that affects people’s freedom in 
any relevant sense (Aune, 1967, p. 38). Only causes that impede the will are 
freedom-undermining. What appears to matter most is whether people do 
something of their own free will; that is, whether they would have done other-
wise if they had chosen, decided, or willed to do so. 
What happens if our bank clerk is panic-stricken? Not panicking physi-
cally—for then her handing over the money would not be an action—but she 
could be in such a shock that she hands over the money psychologically 
blinded and shaken by fear. If this is the case, she could not have chosen, 
willed, or decided to do otherwise even if she would have done otherwise had 
she chosen, willed, or decided to do so (compare Wolf, 1990, p. 99). This 
would again falsify the conditional analysis, for it proves that the analysans 
can be true (she would have done otherwise if) while at the same time the 
analysandum (she could have done otherwise) is not true. A person’s counter-
factual freedom to do anything other than a in the conditional analysis sense 
cannot be what makes that person responsible for a, for cases occur in which 
someone is in this sense free, but not responsible. 
This last objection to the conditional analysis is widely accepted, although 
one final reply to the objection is worth mentioning. The validity of the above 
objection depends on how we analyze the activities of deciding, willing, and 
choosing. We could argue that these activities are not voluntary activities, that 
they are themselves determined by a variety of factors. We choose, want, or 
decide to go to the movies because, for example, we desire to relax a bit and 
believe that going to the movies will help us relax; relaxation is what we need 
most at this moment; we can afford the admission; we will not miss a terribly 
important telephone call; and so on. Our choices, volitions, and decisions are 
determined by desires, reasons, and beliefs; they are not made on no basis at 
all. 
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The conditional analysis could perhaps be improved and successfully 
defended if in the analysans we substitute “if she had chosen, willed, or 
decided to” with “if she had sufficient reason to.” The ability to do otherwise 
could then be analyzed as: would have done otherwise had someone had suffi-
cient reason to do otherwise. This analysis would help us handle the difference 
between our cool and deliberate bank clerk and our panic-stricken one. If the 
cool and deliberate Mary had had sufficient reason not to hand over the money, 
she would not have handed over the money. The panic-stricken Mary, on the 
other hand, would still have handed over the money, even if she knew that 
handing over the money would mean getting herself killed (for instance, 
because she had seen the face of the robber, and the robber now has no option 
but to shoot her). In this rendering of the conditional analysis, cool Mary’s 
action is free, whereas panic-stricken Mary’s action is not. 
Unfortunately, having sufficient reason to do otherwise cannot account 
for all cases in which we base our judgment that someone is responsible for an 
action on the presence of counterfactual freedom. It cannot account, for 
instance, for the category of weak-willed actions in which people have suffi-
cient reason not to do something and recognize these reasons as sufficient 
reasons, but go ahead and do it anyway (see Fischer, 1986, p. 18). If I pour 
myself a glass of wine and drink it, whereas I have every reason to call it a 
night and am aware of these reasons—I even mentioned them while pouring 
the wine—there appears to be no reason to release me from responsibility. In 
these cases I appear to be free enough to be held responsible, although it is not 
true that I would have done otherwise had I had sufficient reason to do so. I 
had sufficient reason to do otherwise! I come back to weakness-of-will expla-
nations in the last two chapters of this book (ch. 3, sec. 4.C and ch. 4, sec. 5.A). 
If we do not believe in the existence of something like weak-willed 
action, still another class of actions exists in which our counterfactual freedom 
cannot be analyzed conditionally. These are our actions that failed to succeed 
without apparent reason: For instance, if we failed to keep our temper; or to 
score in a soccer game, despite the fact that all circumstances were ideal. No 
matter which conditional circumstances you believe in—be it choices and deci-
sions or sufficient reasons—what you blame yourself for is failing simpliciter. 
You do not mean that you could have scored or kept your temper if the causal 
circumstances had been different, but that you could have scored or kept your 
temper in exactly the same circumstances (Austin, 1956, p. 218). 
Various points raised in this section will reappear in the third chapter, 
where I explain why I believe this intuition with regard to the necessity of 
alternative possibilities to be such a strong and persistent one. For the moment, 
let me proceed by explaining why the debate about the conditional analysis 
ended with van Inwagen’s consequence argument. 
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i. The Consequence Argument 
 
The discussion on the conditional analysis was concluded, more or less, with 
Van Inwagen’s consequence argument. In the consequence argument, the 
thesis of determinism is expressed in a very simple and straightforward way 
with a minimum of assumptions, while the lack of an area of genuine agency is 
immediately clear. This renders the controversy surrounding the conditional 
analysis superfluous, because nothing in the consequence argument depends 
upon the interpretation of our ability to do otherwise—not at first sight. Lewis, 
however, criticizes Van Inwagen’s consequence argument and argues that the 
real consequence of it does depend on the interpretation of our ability to do 
otherwise (Lewis, 1981). Remember the consequence argument stated in the 
second section: 
 
If determinism is true, our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature 
and what happened in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on 
before we were born; nor is it up to us what the laws of nature are. There-
fore, the consequences of these things (including our current acts) are not 
up to us (Van Inwagen, 1983, p. 16). 
 
According to Lewis, the worrying consequence of this formula is that if deter-
minism is true, we cannot be responsible for anything we do, because we are 
unable to change the laws of nature or the facts of the past. He argues, that the 
actual consequence Van Inwagen’s argument establishes is not this strong one 
that constitutes incompatibilism, but a much weaker one. This weaker conse-
quence is that if determinism is true, we are only responsible if we are some-
times able to render a proposition that expresses a law of physics false or to 
render a proposition that expresses the state of the world at some point in time 
false. Although it is obvious that we cannot render a law of physics false or 
change the past (the strong consequence), it is not so obvious that we cannot 
render a proposition false that expresses either a law of physics or the state of 
the world at some point in time. The intelligibility of the latter, weaker conse-
quence depends again upon our interpretation of the ability to do otherwise 
than we in fact did. 
Nonetheless, Lewis’s objection has not led to a reopening of the discus-
sion about the conditional analysis. The consensus appears to be that the 
conditional analysis has proven to be unsuccessful. It fails to identify the 
freedom that is necessary for responsibility, and it equally fails to identify the 
freedom that is sufficient for responsibility. It fails to do the latter because 
cases exist in which we possess the conditionally analyzed freedom to do any-
thing other than a, but are not responsible for a. This is the case, for instance, if 
we suffer from so-called unfreedom of the will. It fails to do the former 
because cases occur in which we lack the conditionally analyzed freedom to do 
anything other than a, but are still responsible for a. This is the case, for 
instance, if we render ourselves unable to perform some actions. 
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Since I do not believe in the second influential strategy for avoiding 
incompatibilism that I am about to discuss, I believe that the discussion about 
the exact interpretation of our ability to do otherwise is still very important. I 
will not, however, discuss this issue in much detail, as in this book my interests 
are restricted to the question of freedom only in so far as it is related to the jus-
tification of our daily practices of responsibility. And, as I argue later on in this 
book, to justify our practices of responsibility we need not solve the issue about 
the exact interpretation of our ability to do otherwise. What I hope to have 
established in this section, though, is the lack of easy solutions to the problem 
of justifying our daily practices of responsibility via a common sense compati-
bility of what we mean by “p is responsible for a because p could have done 
something other than a” and “p could not have done anything other than a if 
determinism is true.” This brings us to the second influential strategy to avoid 
incompatibilism. 
 
 
B. The Principle of Alternative Possibilities 
 
Remember PAP as stated at the beginning of this section: A person p is only 
responsible for an action a if p could have done something other than a. The 
first to launch a straightforward attack on this principle was Harry G. Frankfurt 
(Frankfurt, 1969). Frankfurt argues that it is the efficient cause that is relevant 
to the moral assessment of a person, and not the availability or lack of alterna-
tive courses of action (see also Dennett, 1984, ch. 6). If p does a because p 
wants to do a, a lack of alternatives does not lessen p’s responsibility for what 
p does; hence, PAP is false. Frankfurt illustrates his point with two very power-
ful thought experiments, both involving a so-called counterfactual intervener: 
someone (or something) that would intervene to ensure that person p does 
action a, but who (or which) does not intervene because p does a without inter-
vention. Following Van Inwagen, I call these examples “Frankfurt counterex-
amples” (Van Inwagen, 1978, p. 202), even though Frankfurt himself credits 
Robert Nozick as the originator of the counterexamples for which he became 
famous (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 6). 
Suppose Jones is kept hostage in her house by a gangster and forced to 
ignore the cries for help that she hears outside. The threats of the nasty looking 
gangster make an impression on her and would force her to obey had she not 
already decided to stay in the house no matter what happens, because she 
desperately needs to finish the work brought home. If this is the case, two 
things are true: (1) Jones does not have a real alternative to staying in the 
house, because the threats make her stay inside even if she had not decided to 
finish the work; and (2) Jones is morally responsible for staying in the house 
since the threats do not exert any force on her whatsoever. She stays in the 
house because she wants to finish the work brought home. 
We could object to this interpretation of Jones’s so-called inability to do 
otherwise. Although Jones would have succumbed to the threats had she not 
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already decided to do what she was about to be coerced to do, so the objection 
would run, it is not true that she could not do otherwise. Jones is not, for 
instance, paralyzed. Frankfurt anticipates this objection by developing a second 
example around a jack-of-all-trades called Black. Black, by stipulation, is able 
to take sufficient measures to pre-empt all alternative possibilities of Jones’s 
doing a, but does not need to because Jones does a without Black’s interven-
tion. Black’s non-intervening presence secures the absence of alternative 
possibilities without at the same time undermining Jones’s responsibility, 
because Jones does all the nice or nasty things Black wants her to do without 
Black’s actual intervention. 
The point of this example is compelling, for it is unclear how Black’s 
simple looming in the background can affect Jones’s responsibility for what 
she does freely and willingly. No actual difference exists between Jones’s 
doing a in a world without Black’s presence and her doing a in a world with 
Black’s presence. The only difference is a counterfactual one: If Jones had 
tried to do something other than a, she would have found herself unable to do 
so. 
Also convincing is Frankfurt’s explanation of the confusion that lies at the 
origin of PAP. According to Frankfurt, the attraction of PAP derives from a too 
literal and mistaken interpretation of the class of excuses that express our 
inability to do one thing or another. Frankfurt points out that people who claim 
that they could not have done otherwise are only excused if their inability is a 
complete explanation of their action, that is, if it explains why they did not do 
otherwise. The claim that they could not have done otherwise means that they 
would have done otherwise if they had been able to do so. If we discovered that 
the lack of alternative courses of action had in fact no influence whatsoever on 
someone’s behavior, we would no longer accept the inability as an excuse. 
Frankfurt concludes that PAP should be replaced by the following principle: 
You are not morally responsible for what you have done if you did it “only 
because” you could not have done otherwise. And this only-because principle, 
he claims, is compatible with determinism. I deal elaborately with this only-
because principle in the next chapter (sec. 3.A). 
Before we continue our discussion of PAP let me note that although the 
above example applies only to blameworthy actions, I do not believe as, for 
instance, Wolf does, any fundamental asymmetry exists between blameworthy 
and praiseworthy actions in this respect (Wolf, 1980; Wolf, 1990, ch. 4). I 
believe that our intuitions with regard to praiseworthy actions are less clear and 
explicit, probably because we have less reason to be cautious and mindful 
when praising others than we have to be with the negative normative senti-
ments. Praising someone does little harm even if the person in question does 
not deserve it, whereas blame is harmful. The choice to restrict our attention to 
blameworthy actions should be understood to reflect a concern with harming 
people even if they do not deserve it. 
Frankfurt’s argument against PAP initiated an elaborate and complex 
controversy that is still going on. I will not give an overview of the highly 
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complicated arguments and issues that have been raised in connection with it, 
but restrict myself to some preliminary explorations of the connection of PAP 
with the notions of ultimacy and autonomy, both of which are important for the 
conceptual argument in favor of PAP that I develop in the third chapter, and 
the ultimacy pessimism that I discuss in the fourth chapter. For this purpose, I 
use John Martin Fischer’s excellent overview of an important line of argument 
used by those who disagree with Frankfurt counterexamples (Fischer, 1994); I 
also use Robert Kane’s ultimacy principle (Kane, 1996). 
 
 
i. Ultimacy 
 
Kane argues that incompatibilists should accept Frankfurt counterexamples and 
admit that PAP is not in every instance necessary in order to render someone 
responsible for a. Consequently, incompatibilists should argue—as Kane him-
self does—for another principle that mentions alternative possibilities as a nec-
essary condition for responsibility. He calls this principle the ultimacy 
principle (UP). 
UP states that the availability of alternative possibilities is necessary at 
some stage in a person’s life history in order for this person to be responsible 
for a at t1. A person can be responsible for a at t1 even without having any 
alternative possibilities, but only “(. . .) if he was responsible for making him-
self the sort of person that he then [at t1] was by virtue of other choices or 
actions in his life history with respect to which he could have done otherwise” 
(Kane, 1996, p. 42). If determinism is incompatible with this principle—as 
Kane, being an incompatibilist, believes—then the justification issue is back on 
the agenda. 
I prefer to put Kane’s UP differently, but let me first explain why I think 
that Kane’s proposal to substitute the ultimacy principle for PAP is correct. We 
can argue that p is responsible for a even if at the moment of a, or the moments 
preceding a, no alternative possibilities were present (against PAP), as long as 
somewhere in the chain of events leading to a at t1, p could have done some-
thing other than what p in fact did (in favor of UP). If the latter is the case, we 
can translate p’s freedom to do otherwise at some instant t1 (provided that it is 
relevant to the chain of events leading to a) into p’s freedom to prevent a from 
happening and, consequently, into p’s responsibility for a. 
Suppose, for instance, that someone who is unable to swim impersonates 
a lifeguard. The example is Walter Glannon’s (Glannon, 1995, p. 269). Con-
fronted with a swimmer who gets into trouble, this lifeguard is unable to come 
to the swimmer’s rescue. In this case, given Kane’s ultimacy principle, this 
person can be said to be responsible for the drowning of the swimmer if some-
where in the history leading up to the drowning, the lifeguard could have done 
something, anything at all, to rescue the swimmer. This corresponds with my 
intuitions about the case. If, for instance, the impersonation was just a joke or 
an amusement and the impersonator knew the risks involved but still decided to 
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go ahead with the joke, we will blame that person for what happened regardless 
of the lack of alternatives at the moment of the action. If, on the other hand, no 
alternative possibilities were present at all in the chain of events that eventually 
led to the drowning, we would not hold that person responsible. This could be 
the case if, for instance, the inclination to impersonate was irresistible as the 
result of, say, a very peculiar and rare neurosis that drives people to imitate 
figures of authority (such as, in this case, a lifeguard). 
Practical compatibilism focuses on the autonomy-related distinctions, in 
this case on the impersonator’s status as an appropriate subject of the moral 
sentiments. Frankfurt counterexamples, in this respect, beg the question. The 
counterexamples assume that the person who figures in the example is an 
autonomous being. Let us explain this briefly with the help of Fischer’s discus-
sion of what he has called the “flicker of freedom strategy,” a strategy 
employed by those who disagree with the Frankfurt counterexamples (Fischer, 
1994, ch. 7). 
 
 
ii. Autonomy 
 
The flicker of freedom theorist argues that Frankfurt counterexamples are 
invalid because they presuppose some flicker of freedom. They would argue 
that my conclusion that Jones, in the example above, is responsible despite the 
presence of the counterfactual intervener, is provoked by this flicker of free-
dom. Hence, the conclusion that we are responsible regardless of the absence 
of alternative possibilities is not warranted, because even the tiniest flicker of 
freedom constitutes the presence of alternative possibilities. 
Suppose that Black installs a mechanism in Jones’s brain that will enable 
him to intervene in case Jones chooses or is inclined to choose to do something 
other than a. Also suppose, that Jones does all the nasty things Black wants her 
to do without Black interfering. According to the flicker of freedom theorist, 
Jones is only responsible for a if she—at the very minimum—has the freedom 
to initiate a different decision, that is, to choose or be inclined to choose to do 
something other than a. This initiative would perhaps be barely visible because 
it would immediately call for an intervention by Black, but it is, nevertheless, a 
flicker of freedom. 
Such a flicker of freedom, this counter-objection would run, must always 
be present in the alternative sequence (the course of action that Jones does not 
take), no matter how sophisticated the example is. Hence, our intuition that 
Jones is responsible because she chose to do a is still accounted for in terms of 
the presence of an alternative sequence, albeit not a very robust one. 
Another counter-objection of the flicker of freedom theorist is that Jones 
must have the power to bring about a different event. This objection depends 
on an essentialist principle of event individuation in which events are distin-
guished from each other on the grounds of their causal history. If a has Black 
intervening in its causal history, it is a different event from an a that does not 
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have Black intervening in its causal history. 
We could object to such an essentialist rendering of event individuation, 
as Frankfurt himself does. But such an objection would be highly controversial 
and, with regard to the problem at hand, intuitively implausible. With regard to 
someone’s responsibility for a particular event, the causal history of this event 
appears relevant and the difference between Black’s intervention and non-in-
tervention is obvious. And, supposing we want to hold Jones responsible for 
bringing about a state of affairs—instead of holding her responsible for a 
particular event to which the causal history matters—we could wonder, as 
Peter van Inwagen has rightly argued, whether we should still hold her respon-
sible for that state of affairs if we know it would have obtained no matter what 
(Van Inwagen, 1978). 
According to Fischer both counter-arguments aimed at defending PAP 
employ a notion of alternatives that is too thin to account for our ascriptions of 
responsibility (Fischer discusses four, but only these two are relevant for our 
purposes: Fischer, 1994, pp. 138–139). A flicker of freedom that only exists in 
the alternative sequence cannot possibly render us responsible for what we did 
in the actual course of action, let alone in an alternative course of action in 
which we would act unfreely. In order to defend PAP, we need more robust 
alternative courses of action (Fischer, 1994, p. 142). 
This argument transfers the burden of proof incorrectly. To see this, we 
should keep the sequence of the argument in mind. We start with an important 
and widespread intuition that our practices of moral responsibility cannot be 
understood without the availability of alternative possibilities. Frankfurt devel-
ops a powerful example in which doubt is cast on this intuition. Consequently, 
some people—namely, flicker of freedom theorists—want to verify whether 
this example directs our intuitions in the right way, regardless of the absence of 
alternative possibilities. What they want to check is whether the Frankfurt 
counterexamples justify the conclusion that occasions arise on which we 
believe someone to be responsible despite the absence of alternative possibili-
ties. If this is not the case, the force of the Frankfurt counterexamples would 
disappear. If we still intuitively assumed some freedom (even the tiniest 
flicker) to be present in a Frankfurt counterexample, then the example would 
presuppose the freedom the superfluity of which it set out to establish. This 
does not necessarily mean that the flicker of freedom that is presupposed is 
itself enough to ground our ascriptions of moral responsibility. 
Suppose someone argues that dollars (freedom) are not needed to buy 
bread (responsibility), and someone else objects that this can only be estab-
lished if examples involving the purchase of bread (responsibility) do not pre-
suppose the presence of dimes (a flicker of freedom), then, in this dispute, the 
argument that dimes (a flicker of freedom) do not buy us bread (responsibility) 
is the wrong kind of argument. Even if dimes do not buy us bread, we need the 
dimes to get, via the dollars, to the bread. More importantly, we cannot argue 
for the redundancy of dollars with an example that accepts the need for dimes. 
Like the flicker of freedom theorist, both the practical compatibilist and 
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the ultimacy pessimist object to the question-begging element of the Frankfurt 
counterexamples with regard to deep responsibility. If we restrict our attention 
to superficial responsibility, it is right to say that only the efficient causes 
matter, not the available or absent alternatives. We can admit that we are super-
ficially responsible for a if we intentionally and voluntarily bring about a. 
When we want to discuss whether someone is deeply responsible for a if 
determinism is true, Frankfurt counterexamples are question-begging. They 
beg the question whether deeply responsible beings exist even if determinism 
is true, if they already assume that such beings exist even if determinism is 
true. But this is what they assume if the flicker of freedom that is found in the 
examples by the flicker of freedom theorist is a token of the assumption that we 
are dealing with normal human beings like ourselves. 
The assumption that people are normal human beings like ourselves could 
equal the assumption that they are free human beings, who are normally able to 
act in other ways than they did and who are deeply responsible for their actions 
and behavior. The prior assumption that people are free and responsible, as 
may be clear, would render inert the fact that we believe them to be free and 
responsible, regardless of the presence of a counterfactual intervener. For, in 
this case, this assumption no longer establishes the redundancy of alternative 
possibilities for our practices of responsibility in general. 
If we know that people are normal responsible human beings, we know 
that they are responsible for an action a if that action is correctly related to 
them: If they do a because they want to do a (and not because it is caused by 
external interference or constraint). The distinction between acting on your 
own and acting in spite of yourself under the influence of visible external 
impediments—as interference and constraints most of the time are—is clear 
and distinct (I come back to this in the next chapter, sec. 3.B.i). But what about 
the less visible and discernible ultimacy-undermining factors? Why should 
covert non-constraining control—manipulation that we are not aware of—
undermine our responsibility for the resulting behavior (as we normally 
assume), whereas our psychological make-up and genetic inheritance (a 
general condition for all of us if determinism is true) do not? 
What are the general conditions that allow us to distinguish between a 
responsible and a non-responsible human being? What is the difference 
between someone who is manipulated or physically determined to want to do a 
and to do a, and someone who is not? These are the questions a skeptic will 
continue to ask. Even Frankfurt himself remarks that people who do a only 
because they could not do otherwise are not responsible for a, even if they 
wanted to do a (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 10). But how can we ever establish that 
people do not act for the mere reason that they could not do otherwise, if the 
fact that we want to do something (or even want to do something badly) is not 
enough? I discuss this point extensively in the following chapters. For the 
moment, let me introduce the skeptical challenge that motivates the objections 
to the Frankfurt counterexamples and related objections to, for instance, 
constraint compatibilism, which was discussed in section 2. 
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5. The Skeptical Challenge 
 
Like constraint compatibilism, views such as Frankfurt’s link our responsibility 
to a distinction we all experience at one time or another: that between doing 
something because we are forced to do so and doing something because we 
want to do so. This distinction does not establish that when we believe we do a 
because we want to do it, we do it for that reason (and not because we could 
not do otherwise). Also, even if we could establish that we do a because we 
want to do a, we cannot establish that we could have done something other 
than a: Perhaps we could not have wished anything else, given our personal 
history and the laws of nature. 
We understand ourselves as rational, responsible, and free creatures and it 
proves extremely difficult, if not impossible, to see ourselves otherwise. We 
“have to act under the idea of freedom,” as Immanuel Kant is often cited as 
saying. Theoretically we might fancy the idea that we are unfree, but we cannot 
make any choice without regarding ourselves as free (Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 
162–163). Although this idea is a stronghold of philosophers who want to 
defend the compatibility of freedom and determinism, it may equally be used 
in an argument against it. If it is impossible to act otherwise than under the idea 
of freedom, the experience of freedom offers no proof of freedom’s existence. 
Many desires, choices, or beliefs exist that we experience as alien and that 
are best described as “external” to ourselves. Take for instance the experiences 
of compulsive or phobic neurotics and unwilling addicts. But these are not the 
experiences that matter to the skeptic. The experiences (first person) or obser-
vations (second or third person) that sustain the skeptical challenge are those in 
which we feel free and responsible, even though we are not. If it is possible to 
feel free and responsible without being so, and if determinism excludes our 
being free, we may end up concluding that determinism does undermine the 
legitimacy of our daily practices of moral responsibility regardless of our so-
called experience of freedom. 
Unfortunately, we cannot rule out the possibility that some of the actions 
we experience as being motivated by the content of some mental state are, in 
fact, caused by something else, something beyond our power. Striking exam-
ples of such illusions of freedom and responsibility are those in which a so-
called covert non-constraining control is exercised over us, by way of behav-
ioral engineering and manipulation. Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and 
Burrhus Frederic Skinner’s Walden II are fictional illustrations of this 
phenomenon. As Kane observes, these examples—or rather the unease they 
provoke—reveal the importance we attach to something like ultimacy (Kane, 
1996, p. 65). Although people may be living in our Brave New World or 
Walden II who never do anything they would not do in a different so-called 
free world, we do believe (or, some of us do) that they lack something that is 
worth wanting. In the end, we might conclude that we are mistaken about 
this—that, on second thought, nothing worth wanting exists that is missing 
from the Walden and Brave New Worlds—but it is significant that the belief 
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itself is not incoherent. 
We also cannot dismiss the fact that we can gain knowledge of the real 
causes of people’s (or our own) choices, values, and reasons, by investigating 
their background or biological constitution. Some choices, values, and reasons 
are caused by, for example, a delusional psychosis, extreme personal stress, or 
some other psychological disorder due to, for instance, a very strict upbringing. 
It is quite possible that there was a time in which we did not recognize these 
causes and instead believed the choices, values, and reasons were made solely 
by the agent. 
Where would this line of questioning end? Does it have limits in nature 
itself? We do not know whether, once we have scrutinized all the possible 
causes of our behavior and actions, the story of humankind will leave enough 
room for deeply responsible individuals who can be wholeheartedly praised or 
blamed for their actions and behavior (I examine this question in ch. 3). This 
brings me to the theory that I criticize, refine, and defend in this book, and 
which I refer to as “practical compatibilism” or, in its adapted version, “practi-
cal semi-compatibilism.” 
This version of practical compatibilism is not the same as what Christine 
M. Korsgaard has likewise called “practical compatibilism,” a position she 
ascribes to Kant and which she calls “practical” because Kant was not a theo-
retical compatibilist: He did not believe that free will and determinism could be 
reconciled from a single point of view (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 209). What it refers 
to is the inevitability of our practices of responsibility, regardless of determin-
ism’s truth. I elaborate on this in the following chapter. Also, the label “practi-
cal semi-compatibilism” should not be confused with Fischer’s position called 
“semi-compatibilism.” Fischer holds moral responsibility to be compatible 
with determinism while at the same time arguing that determinism rules out all 
alternative courses of action and that we can never act otherwise than we do 
(Fischer, 1994). As will become clear I do not argue for this. What distin-
guishes practical compatibilism from more traditional kinds of compatibilism 
is this: It tries to evade the skeptical challenge by treating responsibility as a 
primitive, basic concept—primitive or basic not in the sense that it cannot be 
analyzed any further, but in the sense that no matter what theoretical insights 
we gain with regard to determinism and (in)compatibilism, there will always be 
people to whom the predicate “responsible” applies. 
I have a proposal about exactly how this might be understood in the 
fourth chapter, but for the moment let it suffice to say that like practical 
compatibilists it argues that the questions that can be raised concerning our 
practices of responsibility are, as Wolf has put it, not about the conditions that 
validate them but about the conditions that regulate them. If the conditions we 
explicate prove to be either incoherent or impossible to satisfy, we should 
abandon or revise those conditions, and not our practices (Wolf, 1990, pp. 16–
17). Consequently, it is not the existence of (deeply) responsible human beings 
that is at stake, but the fairness of the conditions that we use to establish (deep) 
responsibility. As Wallace puts it: “(. . .) the [compatibilist-incompatibilist] 
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debate should be seen as a normative debate, about the conditions that render it 
appropriate to hold a person morally responsible” (Wallace, 1994, p. 85).  
With this understanding of the discussion, as I argue next, practical com-
patibilism appears to change the order of arguments. We do not examine the 
metaphysical assumptions of our daily practices of responsibility, nor do we 
discuss the (in)compatibility of determinism with them or its relevance to them, 
but we discuss the conditions of responsibility, in the assumption that they are, 
at most, unfair if determinism is true. Before going into the exact differences 
and similarities between the traditional and practical (in)compatibilist posi-
tions, I give an overview of the positions that are possible with regard to 
determinism, responsibility, and freedom. 
 
 
6. (In)compatibilism 
 
In the eyes of someone who concentrates on the tension between moral respon-
sibility and determinism, the debate is concerned with two (in)compatibilities: 
that between responsibility and determinism—hereafter I call the resulting 
position “(in)compatibilism (R)”—and that between freedom and determin-
ism—hereafter I call the resulting position “(in)compatibilism (F).” 
(A) In order to argue for incompatibilism (R), the following options are 
available. 
 
(1) Incompatibilism (F) is true and the freedom that is denied by deter-
minism is the same freedom that is necessary for responsibility (which is 
most of the time taken for granted). The most influential representative of 
this position is Van Inwagen (Van Inwagen, 1983). 
Those who believe that they have established incompatibilism (F) can 
draw the following two conclusions. 
(a) Determinism is true; we are not responsible beings. This position is 
called “hard determinism” and few people defend it as such. Neverthe-
less, some defend a version of it, for example, Honderich (Honderich, 
1993) and, more recently, Derk Pereboom (Pereboom, 2001). 
(b) Determinism is not true; we are free and responsible beings. Those 
who draw this conclusion are called libertarians. A recent defender of this 
position is Kane (Kane, 1996). Although the position had been out of 
fashion for quite a few years, it now appears to be back on the philosophi-
cal agenda (Watson, 2003, chs. 5, 9, 15). A big issue for libertarians is to 
explain how indeterminism can make us responsible for our actions. 
 
(2) A second position is defended by, among others, Chisholm, who 
argues that both determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with 
responsibility and that it is agent causation that makes agents responsible 
for their actions. According to Stefaan E. Cuypers, recently people such 
as Randolph Clarke, Timothy O’Connor and William L. Rowe have again 
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tried to make a case for a credible and viable agent-causal theory 
(Cuypers, 1998, p. 278). Cuypers discusses the idea of agent-causality in 
the traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic line as a possible alternative to the 
received view’s naturalistic conception of human agency. His reason to 
look at this possible alternative derives immediately from the received 
view’s failure to do justice to our intuitions concerning human agency and 
responsibility. Like libertarianism, this position is not mainstream (an 
example is Chisholm, 1964), though these theories too appear to be back 
on the philosophical agenda (Watson, 2003, chs. 13, 14). 
 
Authors do not need to draw conclusions in order to establish incompatibilism 
(R). They can stick to explaining the mutual exclusiveness of the truth of 
determinism and the existence of responsible beings and understand their 
arguments as a contribution to a debate in which compatibilism is the dominant 
position. This is generally referred to as “traditional incompatibilism.” 
(B) We can argue for compatibilism (R) in the following four ways. 
Head-on: 
 
(1) By arguing for compatibilism (F) and for the idea that freedom is a 
necessary and sufficient requirement for responsibility, while at the same 
time arguing that our interpretation of freedom is one that shows freedom 
to be compatible with determinism. This position is generally referred to 
as “traditional compatibilism.” An example of this is the conditional 
analysis, discussed in section 4.A. 
 
(2) By arguing against PAP, the principle according to which we are only 
responsible for a if we could have done something other than a. In this 
case, someone who is a compatibilist (R) with regard to responsibility and 
determinism can still be an incompatibilist (F). Recently, this position has 
been developed by Fischer (Fischer, 1994). The most important repre-
sentatives of this position are Frankfurt (Frankfurt, 1969 and 1971) and 
Dworkin (Dworkin, 1988). 
 
People can also argue for compatibilism (R) in a more indirect way. As 
mentioned above, I call this approach “practical compatibilism (R).” Practical 
compatibilism is the view that most people are (deeply) responsible for some of 
their actions regardless of the truth or falsity of determinism. Responsibility, in 
this view, is a primitive concept without which our daily practices cannot be 
adequately described; analysis concentrates on the conditions that we use to 
establish whether someone is a responsible agent. We can argue for practical 
compatibilism (R) in the following two ways: 
 
(3) By arguing that people exist who sometimes choose and act freely and 
that this characteristic makes them responsible for (some of) their actions. 
In this case, a practical compatibilism (F) might be inferred: If determin-
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ism is true then compatibilism (F) is also true, for responsible human 
beings (who are free to choose and act) exist. This position, as I show in 
the next chapter, is partly defended by Wolf. 
 
(4) We can also argue that (most) people are responsible agents most of 
the time because they possess some general ability relevant to responsi-
bility, although they are not able to do otherwise. In this case, a practical 
compatibilism (R) might be inferred: If determinism is true then compati-
bilism (R) must also be true, for responsible agents (in possession of this 
ability relevant to responsibility) exist. This position is consistent with 
incompatibilism (F) and, as I show in the next chapter, is partly defended 
by Wallace (Wallace, 1994). 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I introduced the three main concepts involved in the 
(in)compatibilist discussions about responsibility: determinism, responsibility, 
and freedom. I discussed (in)compatibilism (F) with regard to freedom and 
determinism—the conditional analysis—and showed how it fails to capture the 
freedom that is generally believed to be a necessary or sufficient requirement 
for responsibility. As examples of compatibilist (R) views with regard to 
responsibility and determinism, I discussed the hierarchical authorization 
account and constraint compatibilism. I argued that these views fail to consti-
tute compatibilism (R) in so far as deep responsibility is concerned. Deep 
responsibility, I argued, is linked to the existence of ultimacy and autonomy, 
the conditions for which appear susceptible to the skeptical challenge. I sug-
gested that practical compatibilism might offer a new way out of this dilemma 
by treating responsibility as a primitive concept (I explain how this should be 
understood in the last chapter). Practical compatibilism and its opponent ulti-
macy pessimism will be the subject of the next chapter. 
